
Energiewende creates jobs. Photo: Heinrich Böll Stiftung
Neither the German Energiewende nor the EU’s Energy Union can succeed in isolation. We need a European Energiewende, writes Rebecca Bertram, who leads the European Energy Transition work at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Berlin. Courtesy Energy Transition/Global Energiewende.
The origin of the German Energiewende is purely national. Indeed, when the German federal government decided to embark on the restructuring of Germany’s energy system, it did so without regard for the impact the transition would have on its European neighbors. As a result, the German Energiewende is not always appreciated in Europe to the extent that German policy-makers would like it to be.
Europe provides Energiewende with flexibility
As renewables now make up 32 percent of total electricity generation, the German Energiewende is entering a decisive second phase. In an energy system in which volatile and not always readily available renewable energies comprise the largest share of production, the challenge is increasingly that of efficiently reconciling supply and demand.
In recent years, Germany has benefited significantly from the integrated European power grid. For example, it has fed surplus wind power from northern Germany into the power grids of its neighbors, or has used their grids to transport electricity from northern Germany to industry hubs in the south of Germany. Whenever Germany was at a low point in its own power generation, it was able to obtain conventional electricity from its neighbors.
However, these practices and actions have resulted in considerable unpredictability in the national power grids of the other European countries. Poland, in particular, has objected time and again that this situation is forcing its energy suppliers to adapt their net transmission capacities accordingly.
Such a vision would turn the crisis into a chance for Europe to improve both its negotiating power vis-à-vis Russia, and its status as an international leader in modern and sustainable energy infrastructure
For Germany, this state of affairs was and is convenient for two main reasons. Firstly, it has allowed Germany to export its surplus electricity—at present about 8 percent of its annual electricity consumption—to other European countries. Secondly, it has spared Germany of the costly task of having to build its own flexible electricity infrastructure with large storage capacities and new transmission lines.
Germany’s neighbors, however, unhappy with these parallel and loop flows, have reciprocated by gradually increasing the use of so-called phase-shifters along the borders to Germany to minimize the exploitation of their national power grids. For Germany’s Energiewende, this represents a crucial loss, insofar as the former modus operandi not only allowed for flexibility but also kept the cost of the Energiewende lower than it would otherwise have been without access to the power lines and power markets of its neighbors.
Energiewende will only succeed if adopted across Europe
According to the European Commission’s energy vision for 2030, Europe is to meet 27 percent of its total energy demand with renewable energy, and increase its energy efficiency by 30 percent. In addition, certain capacity mechanisms are to favor the construction of new conventional power plants.
These objectives show above all that the European member states currently are not united in following a greater shared energy vision. Instead, each country continues to pursue purely national energy interests—from coal in Poland to nuclear in France. In light of these differences, it is not surprising that the European Commission does not propose any more ambitious legislation. A change here will only come about if Energiewende pioneers, such as Germany, convince their European neighbors of the economic and security benefits that a restructuring of the energy system entails.
The European Commission has the power to considerably slow down Germany’s Energiewende in the years to come
To be clear, this would be in Germany’s own interest, namely because Germany needs Europe to drive its own Energiewende forward. The European Commission has the power to considerably slow down Germany’s Energiewende in the years to come. For example, the Commission is threatening an end to Germany’s priority access to the grid rule for renewables. A European Energiewende is likewise needed to achieve the climate goals, which Germany and the European Union signed up to as part of the Paris Climate Agreement at the end of 2015. Last but not least, the German Energiewende alone—provided that it finally leads to the much needed GHG emissions reductions—still cannot bring about the necessary turnaround in global climate change.
Europe in crisis needs an energy vision
Europe is currently facing a serious identity crisis. Following Brexit and given the numerous anti-European movements in many EU member states, Europe needs a unifying growth and innovation vision able to attract major investments in an overarching European project.
A European Energiewende could be this vision for Europe. It would not only foster and strengthen a culture of innovation and digitization but also serve to highlight Europe’s role as a global pioneer in sustainable energy policy and increase the international competitiveness of both Germany and Europe.
If Germany is to make a meaningful contribution to the energy policy debate in Europe, Berlin should not limit itself to petty disputes over the priority grid access for renewables or capacity mechanisms
Finally, a European Energiewende would benefit the energy security of Germany and the entire European Union, because locally produced electricity combined with increasing energy efficiency decreases dependency on imports and international price developments. In recent years, the alarming impact of energy insecurity for Europe was distinctly felt with the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes, which served as a painful reminder that the European Union today imports around one third of its natural gas from Russia.
If the European Union is serious about its Energy Union mission, it should directly tie this in with discussions about a European Energiewende. Such a vision would turn the crisis into a chance for Europe to improve both its negotiating power vis-à-vis Russia, and its status as an international leader in modern and sustainable energy infrastructure.
What next?
Therefore, if Germany is to make a meaningful contribution to the energy policy debate in Europe over the next two years, Berlin should not limit itself to petty disputes over the priority grid access for renewables or capacity mechanisms. Rather, Germany should, together with its European neighbors, develop a new narrative about a common European Energiewende – one that addresses the concerns of other European member states as well. This dialogue should focus on Europe’s advantages of economic modernization and international competition. Only then can the Energiewende succeed in both Germany and Europe.
Rebecca Bertram leads the European Energy Transition work at the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Headquarters in Berlin. Her work focuses on integrating the various European energy discussions into the German energy decision-making process. This article was first published on the Energy Transition/Global Energiewende blog and is republished here with permission.
It is obvious that Energiewende is not succeeding in rapid decarbonisation of Germany’s electricity grid. Furthermore, Germans need other EU countries to act as a battery. It is also obvious that the costs are huge.
The bigger question is, why should countries with much lower emissions per kWh and far cheaper retail electricity prices adopt the German approach? We should embrace the most effective solutions, costwise and climatewise. Not the other way round.
Those countries adopt the German approach because it’s a major success.
Those include the most important EU country with much lower emissions per KWh; France!
France decided in 2015 to follow Germany and installed two laws:
– Reducing nuclear share from >75% in 2015 towards 50% in 2025. A reduction speed substantial faster than that of the German Energiewende!
– Increasing renewable fast (to fill the gap).
Also motivated by the results of the simulation studies of their govt institute ADEME which show that 80% renewable in 2050 is the cheapest situation.
Btw.
The lower consumer prices in France are mainly a matter of total different tax(es) regarding electricity and energy.
This shows that the power of the Commission should be reduced.
Creating an EU Energy Union for electricity doesn’t bring economic benefits.
Opposite.
It will:
– create rigidity as it implies extra rules, etc. incl. a superfluous supervising organization.
EU Energy Union will become an obstacle for progress as also visible in USA in regions where they have installed such organizations.
– create a lot of extra costs. Starting with the EU energy union organization,,,
– takes the greater flexibility of present bi-national interconnection agreements away.
Energy Union will hamper the culture of innovation and digitization.
If an EU Energy Union would have existed in the nineties, the Energiewende never would have started in 2000 or within a decade thereafter…
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Btw.
Note the other wrong & nonsense statements in the post such as e.g.:
– “European Energiewende would benefit the energy security of Germany..”
The reliability of the German grid is extreme high, top of the world!
– “European Energiewende could be this vision for Europe.”
So it’s purpose is to increase the EU identity. Another bureaucratic superfluous organization just to help the bureaucrats in Brussel in their battle to show the usefulness of their existence.
If surrounding countries imitate Germany to the same level, then Germany would not be able to dump its excess wind and solar energy into the grids of these countries.
Germany would have to find a way to store that energy for later use.
These other countries would have to do the same.
One way is to require wind and solar plants to add storage, so their supply to the grid is not variable, and goes up and down with demand, i.e., stop using the grid as a crutch. That would reduce the peaking, filling-in and balancing burden on the traditional generators.
In any case, when wind and solar, stochastic supply, become about 40% to 50% of annual supply, seasonal storage will be required in each country.
The stochastic supply was 19.3% in 2016, and surrounding countries are still available to act as electricity absorbers and suppliers, but limits are being reached and objections are occurring.
Building out interconnections with other countries are a partial and temporary remedy, at best.
The longer term solution is energy storage capable of generating at least 100 TWh.
Based on present trends, Germany will be using coal and gas for at least 50% of its gross generation for at least the next few decades; closing down newer coal plants is not very wise.
Willem.
It implies that PtG and batteries become more profitable. So more of those will be installed.
Note that Power-to-Gas will then be out of the pilot phase (=2025).
Some benefits for Germany:
– Those countries will then install more inter-connect capacity as those will become profitable.
– Mass-production of wind turbines, PV-solar, etc. will increase which decreases the costs.
E.g.
NL will increase it’s interconnection capacity with Germany greatly this year.
It facilitates more export of our offshore wind to Germany when the wind starts / increases, as such wind increase usually starts in the west and it takes hours before it reaches Germany. And opposite.
A difference of an hour or two in the time of wind power coming on stream is trivial, when the big picture shows neighbouring countries are more likely to spend up to a week under the same low-wind high pressure system, or alternatively, all experience gales together, with nowhere to send the surplus to. Solar has the same issue – it would be ridiculous to say that Ireland should build enough excess solar to keep Poland running after sundown. An hour later the Poles would be back to using coal.
The distance from e.g. the Borssele North-sea wind parks ~30km before the Dutch coast to those in N.Germany is roughly 400km. So it takes 6 to 24hrs.
The effect is that production, hence prices vary more smoothly and more slowly. Which facilitate GtP and PtG plants to start/increase/decrease/stop production more smoothly. Also reducing the cycling of those plants.
So it reduces overall costs.
Note that:
– 100% renewable is not about solar or wind alone.
– Surplus will also be bought by PtG facilities (alu smelters, etc also) as it’s cheap,
Willem,
Very good points. Denmark is a good example of where things are heading. The media reported with rejoicing tones in Febuary that Denmark had produced all the electricity it needed in a 24 hour period by windpower.
However, Denmark got only 42% of its electricity from wind in 2015. Hard to find any info from 2016 so it may have been less as 2015 was a very windy year there. You can guess where the rest came from.
Denmark has actually produced 140-150% of its electricity demand on windy days. The oversupply has to be exported. The same winds that powers Danish turbines also powers north German ones. Without Norway and Sweden and their hydro, Denmark could not cope.
Problem is, both Sweden and Norway decided to boost their 2020 wind generation targets and they will also have more power than they need. They subsidy scheme for wind is based on green power certificates, the price of which has crashed:
https://about.bnef.com/blog/google-ikea-nordic-wind-power-crush-comes-too-soon-for-sweden/
I downloaded statistics from energinet.dk for 2016, and it seems they averaged 38% wind of which 14% was offshore. Also 2.2% PV. (The percentages are compared to gross consumption.)
It’s quite interesting to check the stats, actually. How about:
Jan 1 17:00, 1% from wind, then 12h later,
Jan 1 05:00, 101% from wind.
April 16, 8 am, 5% wind
April 17, 8 am, 111% wind
Sep 27, 1 am, 1% wind
Sep 28, 1 am, 119% wind
The fastest 1h wind change was was 26% of gross consumption. The fastest 4h change was 73% of consumption. Worst wind hour gave 0.7 MWh wind out of 2800 MWh consumption, or a ratio of 1/4000. Best wind hour, if you can call it that, gave 139% of consumption. Worst rolling 1-week average gave less than 8% of consumption, best week gave 85% of consumption. Ratio of max:min wind delivery during 2016: 6660.
Despite all that variability in electricity generation, Danish electricity supply is one of the most reliable in the world:
SAIDI 15 min/a, about 10 times more reliable than that in USA!
And Denmark will increase generation by wind towards >50% in 2020!
Sure, but Denmark accomplishes that by having gross exports and imports as large as half their consumption (it consumed 33 TWh in 2015, had gross exports of 10 TWh and gross imports of 16 TWh). Denmark has a lot of wind by being a small part of a wider grid. The entire grid can’t do the same.
Well, in the Northern German states wind produces already >100%!
And reading the plans of Sweden, Norway, NL
the other countries to which they interconnect, will also increase wind greatly…
Doesn’t seem to bother Danish authorities considering their expansion plans as they continue to expand.
Neither the authorities in Germany, etc.
The countries you enumerate, including Germany, are at 2-14% wind penetration. They have some room to expand still.
But Germany is getting closer to practical limits. For instance, this Christmas Day and the day after, their wind produced around 30 GWh/hour and they had a consumption around 40 GWh/hour. A few days earlier, wind produced virtually nothing.
Also, in Germany, wind is worth 86% of the average in the spot markets. Denmark is obviously rich enough to keep at it despite value degradation, but again, it’s much more difficult for a large country or region whose neighbors can’t or won’t easily absorb the fluctuations and dampen the price swings.
Willem,
This article in German has a rather interesting graph on Dunkelflaute in Germany January 16-27 2017. You can calculate how much storage would be needed:
https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article161831272/Die-Dunkelflaute-bringt-Deutschlands-Stromversorgung-ans-Limit.html
Nice article. To add to that, here’s a great graph from December in Germany. Too much RE during Christmas, too little before. Also dispels the myth that nuclear can’t load follow:

Yes, for all the praise Germany receives, they’ve been remarkably ineffective at reducing fossil fuel use. Worse yet, much of their non-fossil energy is from biomass burning, the dirtiest kind.
Even the tech media articles about Germany are starting to turn negative.
Germany Runs Up Against the Limits of Renewables
Nathan,
That article in MIT review that you link is far off reality regarding even basic info. E.g. the starting date of the Energiewende. The article states 2010 (it started in 2000).
Contrary to the suggestion in the article you link, CO2 emissions (g/KWh) continue to decline thanks to the (renewable increase due to the) Energiewende:
2005: 335 g/KWh
2010: 315 g/KWh
2015: 312 g/KWh*)
Agree that it doesn’t go fast, but that will change once all nuclear is out (2022).
All nuclear out has highest priority in Germany because that is by far the most dangerous method of electricity generation.
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*) figures from UBA, the official German Environmental Institute.
Btw.
Somehow the Reply button below comments doesn’t operate.
Bas, you try to feed us deliberate lies. Anybody can check UBA website and discover that emission in Germany were 535 g/kWh.
Hochgerechnete Werte für das Jahr 2015 ergeben 535 Gramm pro Kilowattstunde
http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/klima-energie/energieversorgung/strom-waermeversorgung-in-zahlen?sprungmarke=Strommix